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Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how
introspecting one’s mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths
as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such con-
siderations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism—the view that philos-
ophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other mind-
dependent topics suited to a contemplative approach—but this provides us with a
poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves to be doing, formany of
them are concerned with the extra-mental facts about the universe. Evidentialism
therefore gestates a disaster for philosophy, for it ultimately demands an epistemol-
ogy for the investigation into such matter as the abstract and the modal that simply
will not be forthcoming. We make a dierent suggestion: at intuitions are incli-
nations to believe. Hence, according to us, a philosophical argument does well, as
a socio-rhetorical matter of fact, when it is founded on premises philosophers are
generally inclined to believe, whether or not those inclinations to believe connect
appropriately to the extra-mental facts. Accordingly, the role of intuitions (inclina-
tions to believe) in philosophical methodology is non-evidential, and the question
of how they could be used as evidence falls away.
Keywords: intuition, evidence, a priori, inclinations, dispositions, methodology,
dispositional, mentalism
1. Introduction
Prima facie, the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry is evidential. Phi-
losophers use intuitions to decide between competing philosophical view-
points. At the same time, it is prima facie puzzling how intuitions, mere
inner mental states or events, could constitute evidence for certain kinds of
externalmatters of fact.e deployment ofmodal intuitions inmetaphysics,
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for example, is dicult to explain on the evidentialist proposal, as it is mys-
terious how facts about us—that we have such and such intuitions about the
necessary structure of the universe—could provide evidence of how things
are across modal space. Similar points can be made, to a greater or lesser
extent, about the deployment of intuitions in other sub-elds of philosophy.
is puzzle is one that we address in this paper. Broadly, we argue that intu-
itions cannot generally be playing an evidential role in philosophy, since, for
too many tasks, they appear to be unsuited. Hence, if philosophers engaged
in these tasks have been using intuitions as evidence, as many claim, then
they have been engaged in a disastrously misconceived enterprise.
We suggest something else:at intuitions are a subclass of inclinations
to believe.1 Accordingly, we argue that they play purely heuristic and rhetor-
ical roles in the securing of philosophical positions, helping to promote sim-
pler, more psychologically appealing models of reality.2 e primary role of
intuitions, then, is not as truth indicators, but as persuaders, and hence the
problem of how they track extra-mental reality does not arise.
In section 2 of the paper we demonstrate the hopelessness of treating
philosophical intuitions as evidential, showing that the evidential view can-
not account for how intuitions could be successfully deployed as they are of-
ten intended to be—to secure facts about the modal, the abstract and about
other of what we call “troublingly extra-mental” matters—i.e. states and af-
fairs to which we have no known reliable access. In this we generally follow
the work of Goldman and Pust (1998) and Goldman (2007), but we depart
from these in that we reject all “mentalist” solutions to the eect that philo-
sophical inquiry is concerned with mind-dependent entities (e.g. the ex-
plication of folk concepts). In section 3 we say how our own view better
accounts for the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. In section 4 of
the paper we respond to objections to our positive account.
2. e Trouble With Evidentialism
2.1 Why Evidentialism Leads to Mentalism
Alvin Goldman (1987) borrows from Strawson (1959) a distinction between
descriptive and revisionary (or prescriptive) metaphysics. “[D]escriptive
metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about
the world; revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better struc-
ture” (Strawson 1959, 9). Accordingly, descriptive metaphysics need only ac-
1 If one thinks of philosophical intuitions as mostly being classicatory (see Kornblith 1998)
then onemight prefer to regard them as inclinations to judge.e distinction is immaterial
to anything we discuss in this paper. Our arguments are supportive of either version.
2 ough we do not argue the matter here we hold, nonetheless, that when deployed with
care, their use may be virtuous.
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count, in a systematic way, for our particularmetaphysical intuitions. But re-
visionary or prescriptive metaphysics, according to Goldman, “tries to iden-
tify the real constituents of the world, the ones to which we ought to be on-
tologically committed” (Goldman 1987, 528, our emphasis). Accordingly,
prescriptive metaphysics is oen warranted in departing frommetaphysical
intuition. Goldman’s objection to much contemporary metaphysics is that it
blurs the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive metaphysics and,
as a result, the proper evidential role of our intuitions is lost. Out intuitions
would clearly be relevant if the focus were on descriptive metaphysics, for in
that case the aim is to explicate our folk ontology. But if we are investigating
the structure of reality and notmerely people’s common beliefs about it then
the role of intuitions is much less clear. As Goldman puts it: “Why should
we regard intuitions or feelings as reliable indicators of genuine metaphysi-
cal facts?” (Goldman 1992, 57).3
A possible genus of answer that Goldman (2007) himself suggests—as
he also does with Joel Pust (Goldman and Pust 1998)—can be subsumed un-
der the title mentalism. Mentalism is the meta-philosophical view that the
objects of philosophical concern are, in some appropriate sense, mental or
mind-dependent. A mentalist might hold, for instance, that epistemologists
are concerned not with the phenomenon of knowledge but with the appli-
cation of the concept knowledge. For example, where epistemologists like
Gettier identify cases in which an agent has a justied true belief that P but
lacks knowledge that P, thementalist holds that such cases are best described
as cases where we are willing to apply the concept justied true belief but not
the concept knowledge.
3 e worry is not unrelated to P. Benacerraf’s (1973) challenge to Mathematical Platonism:
(Abstract entities are causally inert, therefore, given Platonism, how could we possibly
have a plausible epistemological story that accounts for mathematical justication?) Sider
(2001) addresses a similar matter as it pertains to metaphysics, without resolving it, in the
introduction to Four-Dimensionalism:
Anyoneworking on topics likemine, using themethods I use, is oen asked
a question something like ‘Are you doing descriptive or prescriptive meta-
physics?’. . .What I am doing does not t neatly into either category. . . I fol-
low the descriptive metaphysician in taking ordinary beliefs about meta-
physicalmatters seriously, but I follow the prescriptivemetaphysician in as-
piring to more than autobiography.is conception of the nature of meta-
physics is, I suspect, common tomany of the practitioners of contemporary
analyticmetaphysics. Unfortunately, I also share withmy fellow practition-
ers the lack of a good answer to a very hard follow-up question: why think
that a priori reasoning about synthetic matters of fact is justied? (Sider
2001, xiv)
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Note that Goldman is not moved to mentalism because intuitions, be-
ing mental states, cannot be reliable indicators of extra-mental facts. at
is not Goldman’s claim. Nor should it be. Perceptions are probably best
regarded as mental states, and perceptions are reliable indicators of extra-
mental reality. Hence being mental is no bar to being a reliable indicator
of extra-mental matters. Rather, Goldman’s worries that there is no suf-
ciently obvious mechanism via which intuition could reliably connect to
certain extra-mental matters of philosophical concern. When philosophers
use intuition to evaluate synthetic propositions concerning abstract entities,
epiphenomenal qualia or non-actual possible worlds, for example, the very
nature of the targets of investigation precludes their partaking in a causal
process that might be plausibly thought to be reliable. When philosophers
consider other synthetic matters, such as the persistence of ordinary objects,
the reality of normative facts or the existence of God, the desiredmechanism
is not so much precluded as it is simply hard to imagine. In either kind of
case, the inquiry is undercut by fears concerning the underlying epistemol-
ogy. If there is simply no clear way in which intuition could provide warrant
concerning the topic in question, then what is it we think we are doing when
we use intuition?
For Goldman, mentalism comes to the rescue, neatly explaining how
intuitions can be used as evidence in philosophical inquiry. For we are all
natural authorities on the deployment of our own psychological concepts.
In deciding whether, for example, the concept knowledge applies or not in
some given case, one only need ask oneself whether one would, oneself, be
inclined to apply it.4 On the assumption that one has mastered the concept,
questioning oneself ought to be helpful. Hence, the having of an intuition,
though it is nothing more than some mental state or event, looks to be the
kind of thing that could be truth indicative. It could be some conceptually
revelatory form of introspection and, if the objects of philosophy are con-
cepts and the like, that would explain its utility in philosophy.
Mentalism, however, also has a serious disadvantage in accounting for
the philosophical process: It is at oddswithwhatmanyphilosophers earnestly
take themselves to be doing. For, in many cases, philosophers take them-
selves to be investigating mind-independent matters across actual and pos-
sible contexts, not mind-dependent matters of concept application. Sider
(2001), for instance, is pretty upfront about this:
I am aer the truth about what there is, what the world is really like.
So I do not want merely to describe anyone’s conceptual scheme, not
4 at is not to say that this is an infallible method—others might apply the same concept
dierently, and one somight be at oddswith one’s community. Nonetheless the community
as a whole can conduct its investigations from its collective armchair.
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even if that scheme was thrust upon us by evolution. (Sider 2001, xiv)
Surely Sider’s attitude here is representative of contemporary analytic meta-
physics. And that seems like the right attitude, since the philosopher who
cannot decide whether some state of aairs S ismodally possible presumably
has no diculty applying the concept ofmodal possibility in general, nor any
general problem applying the concepts that appear in the conception of S. In
fact, in some cases, it is constitutive of the philosophical position itself that
its object not bemind-dependent. For example, theistic philosophers do not
regard God as existing in virtue of the way we apply the God-concept, but
as existing independently of it. Similarly, many kinds of moral realist regard
the moral good as existing in some mind-independent sense. One could go
on and on. Clearly, then, no appropriately neutral philosophy of philosophy
could classify all of its topics as mind-dependent.
Accordingly, intuitions are oen used to investigate matters other than
the conceptual. Philosophers, for example, may intuit that phenomenal col-
ors are incompatible without thereby counting this as a conceptual truth—
i.e. as something that pragmatically follows from our disposition to apply
the relevant concepts (See Bealer 1998); Nor, for a second example, is it likely
that the dualist intuition about mind and body is grounded in some correct
conceptual analysis, as if the conceptmind simply involved not body as part
of its meaning. And as a nal instance, it is not a conceptual truth that ob-
jects endure, rather than perdure, the supposed intuitiveness of the former
view notwithstanding.
But that puts us in a dialectical bind: e idea that philosophy seeks
the application conditions of concepts is at odds with the ourishing of re-
alist, non-mentalist philosophies of morality, God, time, space, persistence
etc. But if we conclude, on the other hand, that the objects of philosophi-
cal inquiry can be mind-independent matters that extend beyond the limits
of concept application then we must explain how armchair inquiry, using
intuitions, can possibly provide evidence for them; in particular, how it can
provide evidence concerning objects (like pure possibilia) that play no causal
role in this universe, or objects (like abstract objects) that play no causal role
period, or facts (like normative facts) that do not obviously involve causally
potent truth-makers. Let all such things—that are not only extra-mental
but which also, as far as we can gather, bear no reliable epistemic connec-
tion to the mental—be dubbed ‘troublingly extra-mental facts and entities’.
We hereby formulate the following argument:
1. If philosophical inquiry is typically, or at least oen, concernedwith
troublingly extra-mental facts and entities, then intuition cannot
play its supposed evidential role in philosophical inquiry
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2. Philosophical inquiry is typically, or at least oen, concerned with
troublingly extra-mental facts and entities.
3. Hence, intuition cannot play its supposed evidential role in philo-
sophical inquiry.
To the extent that the reader shares with us the view that a satisfactory intu-
ition-based epistemology for troublingly extra-mental facts and entities is
not forthcoming, and to the degree that she shares with us the view that
philosophers are sincere when they claim to be investigating these trou-
blingly extra-mental facts and entities, she ought to nd the argument per-
suasive. It leaves us with two options: Either intuition plays some other role
in philosophy, which has been confused with an evidential role, or philoso-
phers have been wrongly using intuitions as evidence for facts to which in-
tuition could have no conceivable access, in which case whole swathes of
philosophy are, in essence, a wash. We prefer to give philosophers the ben-
et of the doubt. We therefore pursue the former option.
2.2 Are Arguments Against Evidentialism Self-Defeating?
Before pressing on, note that since we have given an argument against the
idea that intuitions are used, in philosophy, as evidence we ought to address
the contention of Bealer (1992) and Pust (2001) that all such arguments are
self-defeating. Roughly, that is because such arguments use intuitions as ev-
idence for the conclusion that intuitions cannot be evidence. In particular,
Pust contends that arguments like the one presented above take the follow-
ing general form:
(1) Aside frompropositions describing the occurrence of her judgments,
S is justied in believing only those propositions which are part of
the best explanation of S’s making the judgments that she makes.
(2) Propositions about philosophical topic X are not part of the best
explanation of S’s making the judgments that she makes.
(therefore)
(3) S is not justied in believing any propositions about philosophical
topic X.
For instance, he describes Goldman’s attack on contemporary metaphysics
as being essentially, the following:
(1) Aside from propositions describing the occurrence of her judge-
ments, S is justied in believing only those propositions which are
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part of the best explanation of S’s making the judgements that she
makes.
(2) Propositions about metaphysical topic X are not part of the best ex-
planation of S’s making the judgements that she makes.
(therefore)
(3) S is not justied in believing any propositions about metaphysical
topic X.
Pust, however, takes issue with all arguments of this form on the grounds
that it is dicult to see how proposition (1) could be established without ap-
pealing to the very intuitions that the argument is designed to undermine.
For (1) is a principle of epistemological practice established on the basis of
strong epistemic intuitions. More pointedly, the principle, if factual, is a
statement of normative fact; but it is hard to see how the normative facts
can play a causal or counterfactual role in the production of normative intu-
itions. Hence, via their own prescription, statements of form (1) look to be
principles to which we are not entitled.
Since we follow Goldman in nding it unlikely that normative, abstract
or other-worldly states of aairs play a role in the best explanation of how
one comes to have intuitions about abstract or other-worldly states of aairs,
and since we draw the same conclusion that, since they are (probably) not,
we have reason to think that intuitions concerning them are not evidential,
if Goldman’s argument is subject to Pust’s objection then so is ours.
However, this “self-defeating” argument has an unfortunate kinshipwith
a fallacious argument once used to defend reason from its skeptics. Here is
that old argument as put forth by Hume:
If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, it is a proof, that reason
may have some force and authority: if weak, they can never be su-
cient to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding. (Hume
1896, IV: I, 145)
Similarly, one could argue (as Pust more or less does) that if arguments to
the eect that intuitions are not evidential are strong then, since they are
themselves based on intuitive premises, intuitions are used as evidence in
strong arguments. But if such arguments are weak, then they fail to establish
the conclusion that intuitions are not used as evidence. Either way, such
arguments must fail.
However, later in the same passage, Hume contends that this form of
argument is illegitimate, for:
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Reason rst appears in possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and
imposing maxims, with an absolute sway and authority. Her enemy,
therefore, is obliged to take shelter under her protection, and bymak-
ing use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbe-
cility of reason, produces, in a manner, a patent under her band and
seal. (Hume 1896, IV: I, 145)
In other words, the skeptic (whether of intuitions or of reason) is entitled
to use her opponent’s methods in the manner of a reductio. If the method
of intuition works against the method of intuition, then the method of in-
tuition is self-defeating. Pust’s argument falls to this counter, for the skeptic
about intuitionmay indeed use intuitive epistemicmaxims to undermine the
warrant provided by intuition. It is a problem for the evidentialist, not for
the skeptic, that if intuition evidentially supports anything, it evidentially
supports epistemic maxims that deny that intuition can provide any such
support.
However, the skeptic of intuitions leaves some residual dissatisfaction in
taking this line, a form of dissatisfaction that, Hume noted, was residual to
skepticism quite generally:
For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive
scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; [the skeptic]
must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that. . .were his
principles universally and steadily to prevail. . . [a]ll discourse. . .would
immediately cease. . . (Hume 1748, XII: II, 119)
e skeptic about intuitions is also likely to hear the same worry. Her ar-
guments can, ultimately, have little eect, for, as a pragmatic matter of fact,
philosophers have nothing else to appeal to when it comes to securing ulti-
mate premises. As Timothy Williamson (2007) says:
When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they
appeal to intuitions. It can seem, and is sometimes said, that any
philosophical dispute, when pushed back far enough, turns into a
conict of intuitions about ultimate premises: “In the end, all we have
to go on is our intuitions.” (Williamson 2007, 214)
Accordingly, Williamson suggests that we:
. . . proceed on the working hypothesis that evidence plays a role in
philosophy not radically dierent from its role in all other intellec-
tual disciplines. Without such a role, what would entitle philosophy
to be regarded as a discipline at all. (Williamson 2007, 214, original
emphasis)
Similarly, here is Janet Levin (2004), recapitulating an argument she nds in
Bealer:
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the rst premise [is] that, without appeal to the reliability of some
source of extra-empirical evidence, we can have no grounds what-
soever for modal, epistemic, or other normative claims, the second
that intuitions of the sort described are the best candidates for such
evidence. (Levin 2004, 198)
Levin calls this ‘the Argument fromNeed’.5 We take it that the argument can
be unpacked as follows:
Stage 1
1. If we have no reliable extra-empirical source of evidence, then we
cannot have any grounds whatsoever for philosophical claims such
as those about modality, epistemology, or other normative claims.
2. Surely, we can have some grounds for such claims.
3. Hence, we have some reliable extra-empirical source of evidence.
Stage 2
4. Philosophical intuitions are the best candidates for being a reliable
extra-empirical source of evidence.
5. Hence, philosophical intuitions are a reliable extra-empirical source
of evidence.
Some anti-evidentialists may simply reject premise (2)—holding that there
really are no grounds for modal, epistemic, and normative claims. However,
depending upon what is meant by ‘grounds’, such skepticism may not be
necessary. For we could grant that there are “grounds” for such claims—in
the sense that there are non-arbitrary reasons to make those claims rather
than some others—yet deny that these grounds are evidential. is is what
we mean to do. We maintain that philosophy is not reliant, ultimately, upon
intuitive evidence (and this serves as our second response to the self-defeat-
ing argument—that our skepticism about the evidential status of intuitions
is, though based upon intuitions, not evidentially based upon intuitions). We
concede that, ultimately, arguments may appeal to intuitions; we concede
that intuitions may play a role in giving rise to beliefs about metaphysical,
modal, ethical and epistemic matters of fact; we concede, moreover, that
intuitions give rise to beliefs with the same content—i.e. an intuition that
P gives rise to a belief that P, not a belief that Q; but we do not concede that
5 (Levin 2004). Levin claims to nd it in Bealer (2000, 7), but the citation she gives leads to
an “intuition-skepticism is self-defeating” type argument, of the sort we sketched by Pust.
Still, the argument from need, pretty much the way Levin writes it, does the rounds.
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intuitions are thereby deployed as evidence. Getting clear on this claim, then,
and showing how it answers many of the problems that have already been
raised, is the principal aim of the next section.
3. Intuitions as Inclinations to Believe
3.1 e Initial Plausibility of Ouresis
Harry the philosopher has several strong but brute inclinations to believe.
Namely, he is strongly inclined to believe P, Q, R and S. As it happens, the
other philosophers in Harry’s community are, with few exceptions, also in-
clined to believe the same propositions. Strangely, none of the philosophers
has any introspective access to why they are so inclined. In fact, none of
them can think of an argument for P, Q, R or S that does not rest on less ap-
pealing premises. Hence, they do not give arguments for the four proposi-
tions. Nevertheless, most philosophers believe P, Q, R and S and use them in
premises for other arguments. Positions, moreover, that entail the negations
of these four are generally taken to be bad. Harry, for instance, has made a
career writing papers showing that theory T or T* is false because it entails
either ∼P, ∼Q, ∼R, or ∼S. Here and there are philosophers—oen those who
support T or T*—who deny P, Q, R or S and insist that Harry provide an
argument. Harry cannot, but he has not much time for such people anyway,
for when they claim not to believe P, Q, R or S, Harry secretly regards them
as liars.
On the face of it, Harry’s inscrutable inclinations to believe behave a lot
like intuitions. Moreover, when Harry introspects his inscrutable inclina-
tions to believe he nds nothing that diers from a strong intuition. So here
we have a plausible conjecture; intuitions are a kind of inclination to be-
lieve. In the next subsectionwe see how the conjecture answers the problems
raised for intuitions in general.
3.2 Taking Care of the Explananda
We maintain that intuitions, being inclinations to believe, are not used as
evidence in philosophy. But if they are not then why do they appear to be so
used? Specically:
Howdo intuitions give rise to beliefs if they do not provide evidence
for them? Moreover, if they are not evidential, why do intuitions
that P give rise to beliefs that P, not beliefs in some arbitrary Q?
Whydo agents appeal to intuitions in accounting for their beliefs?—
when asked why one believes that P, why is it appropriate to reply
that one nds P intuitive?
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How have non-evidential intuitions been deployed so successfully
in philosophical argument?
In answer, we maintain that intuitions are a kind of inclination to believe.
It is therefore not surprising that they lead to beliefs. Aer all, it is a brute
psychological fact that S’s (occurrent) inclination to X leads, typically, given
opportunity, ability and a lack of opposing inclinations, to S’s X-ing. For
example, an inclination to go to bed leads, given a lack of opposing incli-
nations, to one going to bed, provided one is able. Hence, it is no mystery
that S’s inclination to believe that P leads, typically, given opportunity, ability
and a lack of opposing inclinations, to S’s believing that P. e connection
between the inclination to believe and the subsequent believing is the same
connection we see between any inclination to X and the subsequent Xing.
Note that the account is merely causal, as opposed to inferential. Causal
accounts, however, must answer the following question: Why is it that the
intuition that P, in merely causing the subsequent belief, causes a belief that
P, not some other belief with arbitrary contentQ? I.e. what is themechanism
of content preservation? If the transition from input to output was an infer-
ence, rather than mere causation, then output would thereby be constrained
to be content-related to the input. But since, on our view, the transition is
not inferential, but the inputs and outputs are still content-related (indeed,
content identical), what is providing the relevant constraint?
e inclinations to believe thesismeets this demand. For on our account,
an intuition that P is an inclination to believe P, not anything else, so one
satises the inclination only by adopting a belief with the content P. at
is why intuitions that P give rise to beliefs with the same content. Content
preservation is non-mysterious on our account.
e second explanandum is also readily taken care of. One can account
for one’s belief by appealing to one’s intuitions because an intuition is an
inclination to believe, hence:
I believe P because I nd P intuitive
is akin to:
I believe P because I am inclined to believe P.
In this way, the appeal to intuitions is classied as a form of praxic reason-
giving: e agent is asked why she is taking a certain action and she re-
sponds by saying that she is inclined to. We give answers like this all the
time, whether we are accounting for why we chose the soup over the salad
(because I am inclined towards the soup) or accounting for why we holi-
dayed in Portugal rather than Mexico (I am inclined towards Portugal) or
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whatever.ough one might have hoped for something more illuminating,
such answers are nonetheless conversationally adequate.ey are (minimal)
positive responses to requests for praxic reasons—requests for the motiva-
tion of action. In the same way, we regard the holding of a belief as an on-
going choice on the part of the believer and the question of why one holds
the belief as a request for the motivation for the choice.e answer ‘because
I intuit it’—being equal to the minimal positive response ‘because I am in-
clined to believe it’—meets the norms for praxic reason giving. ough, as
before, one might have hoped for something more illuminating, as before,
the answer is nonetheless conversationally adequate.
Finally, we can explain hownon-evidential intuitions have beendeployed
so successfully in philosophical argument. For the propositional contents
of strong intuitions are thereby the targets of strong inclinations to believe,
and so they stand as persuasive premises in arguments. If Jones bases her
argument on P, for example, and everyone she aims to convince has a strong
inclination to believe that P (and—even better—no competing inclination to
believe otherwise) then Jones’ argument is likely to be successful.at does
not make inclinations to believe into evidence. Nor does it mean that Jones’s
conclusion is justied. But the argument Jones ran is based on a proposition
people are inclined to believe and so—as a psycho-social matter of fact—it
will be convincing. And that is all one needs to run an eective argument.
Lastly, and most importantly, the position gives us a clear path through
the dilemma raised in the earlier part of the paper; namely, that either philo-
sophers who claim to be working on troublingly extra-mental entities re-
ally are trying to do that, but they are using tools which, by any account
we can imagine, are unsuited to the task, or they are engaged in some suit-
ably conservative business of concept explication, or something similar, in
which case those who take themselves to be working on extra-mental mat-
ters are agrantly confused about the targets of their investigation.e trou-
ble arises, we think, only if intuitions are taken to be both directed towards
troublingly extra-mental aairs and evidential. But on the inclination-to-
believe view, they play their role in philosophicalmethodology by being per-
suasive, not by being evidential or truth indicative. As a result, they can be
about any extra-mental thing you like. It is only important, in getting the
rhetorical job done, that they be shared; not that they be right, appropriately
related to their objects or reliably formed.
3.3 Could Inclinations to Believe Be Forms of Evidence?
None of which is to say that inclinations to believe could not ever be truth
indicative. We claim only that they need not be, in order to explain their
deployment in philosophical method. eir role as persuaders, and hence
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as the bases of arguments, is accounted for by their being identied with a
sub-class of generally held inclinations to believe. ose intuitions that are
generally held inclinations to believe will be persuasive. ose that are rare
and idiosyncratic will prompt only puzzled stares.
Still one wants to ask: Are our inclinations to believe truth indicative?
e proposition is plausible. Our inclination to eat sugar emerges from an
evolutionary history throughout which energy was in short supply. Simi-
larly, our inclinations to believe may be based in processes that reliably led
to survival, reproductive success and good things quite generally. If so, then
there is prima facie reason to expect that one’s epistemic instincts are worth
attending to, and there is no denying that inclinations to believe are oen
the starting point of productive lines of inquiry.
However, we suspect that intuitions, though psychologically homogeneous
—i.e. all belonging to the class of inclinations to believe—are probably none-
theless epistemically heterogeneous—i.e. reliable to radically dierent extents
thanks to having radically dierent connections to their objects. We suspect
this not because we have any direct evidence for it but because it is prima
facie unlikely that our metaphysical, modal, moral, epistemic and semantic
inclinations to believe are all connected to the truth via a single consistently
reliable mechanism, given that the abstract and concrete, actual and non-
actual targets of those intuitions are so diverse. But if our intuitions connect
to their truth-makers via dierent mechanisms (or, as a special case, if they
do not connect at all) then they are therefore reliable (or not) to radically
dierent extents.
(is, of course, raises another problem for the evidentialist, for she can
explain the fact that intuitions aremore or less equally persuasive across sub-
disciplines only by supposing that they are more or less equally evidential.
Given that intuitions are almost certainly epistemically diverse—admitting
of great variation in the reliability of their connection to the facts—this is
prima facie unlikely. But the alternative to this is that intuitions are uni-
formly psychologically persuasive despite being epistemically diverse, which
means that their persuasiveness is not a function of their epistemic worth,
but of their psychological strength across a range of individuals. But once
this is conceded, why bother to suppose that they are evidential at all?eir
action in the philosophical community is entirely explained by their psycho-
logical eect.)
4. Objections to the Positive Account
4.1 Competitive vs. Net Inclinations
Here’s a central objection to our proposal: ere at least appear to be cases
where one has an intuition without an accompanying inclination to believe.
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It seems coherent, that is, to claim:
(i) I have an intuition that P but I am not inclined to believe it.
One thinks of the naïve comprehension axiom: One might nd it intuitive
while having no inclination to believe it.6 Hence, it would seem, our thesis
is mistaken. For there is no way that one can have an intuition that P with-
out an accompanying inclination to believe if intuitions are inclinations to
believe (of some sort.)7
is objection can bemet bymaking a distinction between net and com-
petitive inclinations.8 Competitive inclinations can be co-occurrent in the
agent—for example, one can have a competitive inclination to eat the cake
and a simultaneous competitive inclination to stay on one’s diet. Net incli-
nations, on the other hand, are what is le once the competitive inclinations
ght it out. e net inclination is the winner of the ght. In the end, then,
one either has a net inclination to eat the cake (and, ceteris paribus, one goes
ahead) or one does not (and, ceteris paribus, one does not.)
Accordingly, one can account for the apparent ability of intuitions to part
from inclinations to believe by regarding the former as a species of compet-
itive inclination.at way, one can read (i) as follows:
(ii) I have an intuition that P but no net inclination to believe it.
And substituting a competitive inclination to believe in for the intuition, the
proper reading of (ii) (and therefore (i)) becomes:
(iii) I have a competitive inclination to believe that P but no net inclina-
tion to believe it.
But that is clearly possible since one can have a competitive inclination to be-
lieve without an accompanying net inclination, simplywhen the competitive
inclination fails to win out. So one might have an intuition (i.e. a competi-
tive inclination to believe) that the naive comprehension axiom is true that
6 e example, used to slightly dierent eect, appears in (Bealer 1992) and elsewhere. Bealer
credits the example to GeorgeMyro (Bealer 1992, 130). Plantinga (1993, 110) also notes that
intuitions linger beyond refutation. Kagan (1989) argues that some moral intuitions are
informationally encapsulated, i.e. tolerant of opposing beliefs. See (Pust 2000, 34–35) for
discussion.
7 RobertMay andAdamSennet each—on separate occasions—brought this objection to our
attention. We thank both for helping us clarify our position.
8 Robert Cummins (1998) argues that intuitions change via reective equilibrium (RE). I.e.
via a process of continual and mutual readjustment between intuition, theory and data.
Cummins’ view is quite compatible with our own, according to which adjustments to in-
tuition are nothing more than adjustments to the relevant competing inclinations.
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is opposed by an overwhelming (competitive) inclination to believe the op-
posite (arising from Russell’s proof).is results in a net inclination against
believing in the axiom resulting in the situation expressed in (iii).9
4.2 e Episodic Objection
Focusing on the work of Ernest Sosa (1998), Pust (2000) argues that inclina-
tion/disposition-to-believe views fail to capture the occurrent nature of in-
tuitions, and that attempts to patch them up run into further diculties.
Bealer (1998), in similar fashion, argues as follows:
9 Still, a determined opponent might claim that the following is coherent:
(iv) I have an intuition that P but no competitive inclination to believe that P.
Our thesis is incompatible with any true claim of this sort. However, it is not obvious that
there are real cases like this. In fact, there are good reasons to think there are not, for note
that there are obviously cases like (v):
(v) I have an intuition that P but no competitive inclination to not believe that P.
For instance, one has a strong intuition that everything has the same properties as itself,
and one has no way to doubt it.ere are also clear cases of the following:
(vi) I have no competitive inclination to believe that P and no competitive inclina-
tion to not believe that P.
Trivially, such cases occur when one has not contemplated P at all, or where the propo-
sition in question is an empirical matter of little importance about which one is utterly
uninformed. Given that there are cases of (v) and (vi), and also given (we are granting for
reductio) that cases like (iv) exist, there ought to be cases where the three are combined to
make:
(vii) I have an intuition that P yet no competitive inclination to believe that P and no
competitive inclination to not believe that P.
For the fact that there are cases of (iv) means that the rst two conjuncts of (vii) are com-
patible, and the fact that there are cases of (v) means that (the rst and third conjuncts of
(vii)) are also compatible; and the fact that there are cases of (vi) means, in the same fash-
ion, that the second and third conjuncts of (vii)) are compatible too. So we should have
cases of (vii) because (ceteris paribus) we should have (at least possible) cases of A ∧ B ∧ C
whenever we have cases of A ∧ B, A ∧C and B ∧C. But there are no cases of (vii)!ere are
no cases in which one has an intuition that P and yet—despite there being no inclination to
resist it—there is still no inclination to believe that P. And it is not even clear that there are
possible cases. For the mind boggles at what it would be like to nd a proposition intuitive
and yet, despite a lack of any reason to doubt it, have no inclination to believe it whatso-
ever. Hence, given the clear existence of cases of (v) and (vi), the lack of possible cases of
(vii) is surprising unless there are no cases of (iv). Hence we have some reason to doubt
that cases of (iv) are possible.
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As I amwriting this, I have spontaneous inclinations to believe count-
less things about, say, numbers. But at this very moment I am having
no intuition about numbers. I am trying to write, and that is about all
I can do at once; my mind is full. If I am to have an intuition about
numbers, then above and beyond a mere inclination, something else
must happen—a sui generis cognitive episode must occur. Inclina-
tions to believe are simply not episodic in this way. (Bealer 1998, 209)
In brief, then, intuitions are episodic; inclinations to believe are not; hence
intuitions are not inclinations to believe.
We do not concede, however, that intuitions are always (or even usu-
ally) occurrent or episodic.e most compelling reason to think otherwise
comes from considering the truth conditions of intuition statements: For if
one claims at t that Gettier has an intuition that P then what one says is true
if P is something that Gettier generally intuits, regardless of what occurrent
state he happens to be in at t. It really does not matter for example if, at the
time of the utterance, Gettier is asleep and having no episodic mental states
with content P. One would truly say he intuits P nonetheless. But, surely,
‘Gettier intuits that P’ is true only if Gettier intuits that P. Hence, when one
says, truly, while he is asleep, that Gettier intuits that P then, since one said it
truly, it follows that he intuits that P, despite the lack of any episodic mental
state with the content P. But if he can intuit that P without there being any
episodic mental state with the content P then it follows that intuiting that P
is not an episodic mental state.
Why, then, would anyone think that intuitions are episodic? Presumably
because we are aware of having an intuition only when we are experiencing
episodic consciousness of it. However, to conclude from this that they are al-
ways occurrent is to commit the “refrigerator-light fallacy”: To confuse that
which is always the case when you are looking with that which is always the
case. Of course, intuitions are always episodic when we have them episodi-
cally. What about when we are not having one episodically? In that case, it
might appear, from introspection alone, that the intuition is absent. In fact,
however, it is merely non-occurrent.
4.3 Some Inclinations to Believe are Not Intuitions
Consider the following objection to intuitions being inclinations to believe,
which comes from Bealer:
Consider a posteriori necessities that. . . lie beyond the reach of our
rational intuition: for example, that gold has atomic number 79, that
heat involves microscopic motion, and so forth. Presumably, by suit-
ably modifying the brain we could cause a subject to acquire the sort
of spontaneous inclination [to believe] featured in the proposed re-
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duction. We could, for example, cause someone to have a sponta-
neous inclination to believe that gold has atomic number 79. . .But
the person would still not be able to intuit these necessities, for in
that case they would be a priori, not a posteriori, as everyone takes
them to be.
For Bealer, an intuition can only have as its target an a priori proposition.
But an inclination to believe can have anything as its target. Hence intuitions
cannot simply be inclinations to believe.
However, this is compatible with our thesis. For we only claim that in-
tuitions are a kind of inclination to believe. Hence we can concede, for the
sake of argument, that all intuitions concern the a priori, in which case the
class of intuitions is some appropriate sub-class of the set of inclinations to
believe; one whose members only concern the a priori.us, when the neu-
rosurgeon implants an inclination to believe that P, where P is an a posteriori
truth, it follows that that inclination to believe is not an intuition. Bealer’s
counterexample, therefore, fails to threaten our project.
5. Further Directions
One may reasonably ask, however, about the remainder of the account. If
intuitions are only a kind of inclination to believe, then what kind exactly
are they? Right now, we have no precise answer. However, we would resist
any suggestion that this renders the project uninformative. For one thing,
our project is strictly at odds with other projects that count intuitions as
forms of evidence, intellectual seemings, abstractions from background be-
liefs, judgments (see Earlenbaugh andMolyneux 2009) and so on. So we are
obviously making a substantial claim. More importantly, though, we think
that worthwhile work is done when one reaps an explanatory reward from
correctly locating a kind in the overall taxonomy. For instance, if one derives
an explanatory reward from classifying a platypus as a mammal then one
thereby makes a useful contribution, even if there is still the open question
“Exactly what kind of mammal is a platypus that makes it distinct from all
others?” Similarly, we get an explanatory pay-o from classifying intuitions
as inclinations to believe for we are able to explain how it is that intuitions
play the role in philosophical method that they do without having to posit
some strange truth detecting relation between mental states and the deepest
most austere facts about reality. ere is, of course, a residual question—
“Exactly what kind of inclination to believe are intuitions?” but it is one that
can wait.
Ultimately, of course, it will be important to determine what kind of in-
clinations to believe intuitions are. Perhaps Bealer is right that intuitions are
marked by their connection to the a priori. As we just argued, that is com-
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patible with our view (however, it excludes kinds of inclinations to believe
that, it seems to us, are also best classed as intuitions). Alternatively, perhaps
the distinguishing feature of intuitions is their relative inscrutability. With
other inclinations to believe we usually have a good idea why we have the
inclination. I might be inclined to believe what is right before my eyes, for
example, but that is because of the potency of the sensory data; I might be
inclined to believe in a pleasant aerlife simply because it is seems comfort-
ing to me. But in that case, again, I know why I am inclined to believe it. It
is oen much harder, with intuitions, to say why we believe what we do. So
perhaps this is the hallmark of the intuition, what distinguishes it from other
inclinations to believe. At this point in time, the correct answer is unclear.
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